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 WHEN	DOES	CORPORATE	CRIMINAL	LIABILITY	FOR	
INSIDER	TRADING	MAKE	SENSE?	
John	P.	Anderson*	
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporations	are	subject	to	broad	criminal	liability	for	the	insider	
trading	 of	 their	 employees.	 Critics	 have	 noted	 that	 this	 results	 in	 a	
harsh	 irony.	 “After	all,”	Professor	 Jonathan	Macey	of	Yale	Law	argues,	
“it	is	generally	the	employer	who	is	harmed	by	the	insider	trading.”1	In	
the	 same	 vein,	 former	 chairman	 of	 the	 Securities	 and	 Exchange	
Commission	(SEC)	Harvey	L.	Pitt	and	former	attorney	of	the	Division	of	
Enforcement	 of	 the	 SEC	 Karen	 L.	 Shapiro	 point	 out	 that,	 “[f]ar	 from	
being	responsible	for	their	employees’	violations	of	the	law	.	.	.	most	of	
the	employers	who	have	had	the	unfortunate	experience	of	employing	
[insider	 traders]	 are	 in	 fact	 the	 only	 true	 victims,	 in	 an	 otherwise	
victimless	crime.”2	
It	 is	 clear	 that	 not	 all	 insider	 trading	 is	 victimless,	 and	 not	 all	
employers	 of	 insider	 traders	 are	 innocent.	 But	 I	 am	 convinced	 that	
these	 critics	 are	 correct	 to	 point	 out	 that	 the	 current	 enforcement	
regime	is	absurdly	overbroad	in	that	it	affords	no	principled	guarantee	
to	corporate	victims	of	insider	trading	that	they	will	not	be	indicted	for	
the	crimes	perpetrated	against	them.	
The	law	should	be	reformed	to	ensure	that	corporations	are	only	
held	criminally	liable	where	they	are	guilty	of	some	wrongdoing.	Part	II	
of	 this	 Article	 outlines	 current	 law	 in	 the	 United	 States	 concerning	
corporate	 criminal	 liability	 in	 general.	 Part	 III	 looks	 at	 corporate	
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	 1.	 JONATHAN	R.	MACEY,	INSIDER	TRADING:	ECONOMICS,	POLITICS,	AND	POLICY	65–66	(1991).	
	 2.	 Harvey	L.	Pitt	&	Karen	L.	Shapiro,	Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at 
the Next Decade,	7	YALE	J.	ON	REG.	149,	240	(1990).	
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liability	 for	 insider	 trading	under	 the	current	regime.	Part	 IV	explains	
why	 the	 current	 regime	 is	 absurdly	 overbroad	 and	 in	 dire	 need	 of	
reform.	 Part	 V	 suggests	 some	 reforms	 that	 would	 render	 corporate	
criminal	liability	for	insider	trading	more	rational,	efficient,	and	just.	
II. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN GENERAL 
Some	have	argued	that	the	very	idea	of	corporate	criminal	liability	
is	 incoherent.3	 After	 all,	 a	 crime	 requires	 both	 an	actus reus	 (a	 guilty	
act)	and	a	mens rea	(a	guilty	mind),	but	“corporations	have	no	bodies	or	
limbs	 with	 which	 to	 perform	 actions	 and	 no	 brains	 in	 which	mental	
states	 can	 reside.”4	 Indeed,	 up	 until	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	
century,	 the	 general	 rule	 appeared	 to	be	 that	 “[a]	 corporation	 cannot	
commit	 trea[s]on,	 or	 felony,	 or	 other	 crim[es],	 in	 [its]	 corporate	
capacity:	 though	 [its]	 members	 may,	 in	 their	 di[s]tinct	 individual	
capacities.”5	
Nevertheless,	 the	 rule	 that	 corporations	 could	not	 incur	 criminal	
liability	was	rejected	by	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	in	New York 
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States.6	 A	 railroad	
company	 and	 its	 assistant	 traffic	 managers	 were	 convicted	 for	 the	
payment	 of	 illegal	 rebates	 on	 the	 shipment	 of	 sugar.7	 Despite	 the	
objection	that	imposing	criminal	liability	on	a	corporation	“is	in	reality	
to	 punish	 the	 innocent	 stockholders,”	 the	 Court	 applied	 the	 civil	
	
	 3.	 See generally, e.g.,	 John	 Hasnas,	 The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of 
Corporate Criminal Liability,	46	AM.	CRIM.	L.	REV.	1329,	1333	(2009)	(arguing	that	corporations	are	
“not	 morally	 responsible	 agents”	 and	 therefore	 cannot	 be	 “subject	 to	 criminal	 punishment”);	
Manuel	 Velasquez,	 Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility,	 13	 BUS.	 ETHICS	 Q.	 531	 (2003)	
(discussing	 the	 fallacies	 attributed	 to	 the	 collectivist	 view	 that	 a	 corporation	 can	 be	 held	
criminally	liable).	
	 4.	 Hasnas,	supra	note	3,	at	1337.	Professor	Hasnas	goes	on	to	make	the	point	that	corporate	
criminal	 liability	 is	also	problematic	because	corporate	criminal	punishment	violates	all	three	of	
the	following	necessary	conditions	for	criminal	punishment:	
(1)	 Criminal	 sanctions	 may	 be	 applied	 only	 when	 doing	 so	 advances	 a	 legitimate	
purpose	of	punishment;	(2)	[c]riminal	sanctions	may	be	applied	only	when	doing	so	
does	 not	 create	 an	 unacceptable	 risk	 of	 prosecutorial	 error	 or	 abuse;	 and	 (3)	
[c]riminal	sanctions	may	be	applied	only	when	necessary	to	address	a	public	harm.	
Id.	at	1336.	
	 5.	 WILLIAM	BLACKSTONE,	1	COMMENTARIES	ON	THE	LAWS	OF	ENGLAND	455,	464	(1765).	This	view	
was	not,	however,	universally	held.	The	Supreme	Court’s	opinion	in	New	York	Central	&	Hudson	
River	 Railroad	 Co.	 v.	 United	 States,	 212	 U.S.	 481,	 492–93	 (1909)	 cites	 an	 emerging	 trend	 of	
contrary	authorities.	See also	HARRY	FIRST,	BUSINESS	CRIME	180	(1990)	(“English	courts	even	before	
Blackstone	had	 imposed	 liability	 on	government	 entities	 for	nuisance	arising	out	of	 a	 failure	 to	
keep	up	bridges	and	roads.”).	
	 6.	 212	U.S.	481	(1909).	
 7. Id.	at	489.	
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doctrine	 of	 respondeat superior	 to	 uphold	 the	 railroad’s	 conviction.8	
The	 Court	 explained	 that,	 “in	 the	 interest	 of	 public	 policy,”	 it	 is	
necessary	 to	 extend	 the	 civil	 doctrine	 of	 vicarious	 liability	 to	 the	
criminal	 context	 in	 those	 circumstances	 where	 the	 law	 could	 not	
otherwise	be	“effectually	enforced.”9	The	Court	went	on,	
We	see	no	valid	objection	in	law,	and	every	reason	in	public	policy,	
why	the	corporation,	which	profits	by	the	transaction,	and	can	only	
act	through	its	agents	and	officers,	shall	be	held	punishable	by	fine	
because	 of	 the	 knowledge	 and	 intent	 of	 its	 agents	 to	whom	 it	 has	
intrusted	authority	to	act	.	.	.	.10	
At	the	end	of	the	day,	the	Court	concluded	that	“it	cannot	shut	its	
eyes	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 great	 majority	 of	 business	 transactions	 in	
modern	times	are	conducted	through	[corporations].”11	Consequently,	
“to	 give	 them	 immunity	 from	 all	 punishment	 because	 of	 the	 old	 and	
exploded	 doctrine	 that	 a	 corporation	 cannot	 commit	 a	 crime	 would	
virtually	 take	 away	 the	 only	 means	 of	 effectually	 controlling	 the	
subject‐matter	and	correcting	the	abuses	aimed	at.”12	
The	 Court	 in	New York Central	 laid	 out	 a	 basic	 two‐part	 test	 for	
when	 corporations	may	 be	 held	 criminally	 liable	 for	 the	 acts	 of	 their	
employees:	(1)	the	employee	must	perform	the	criminal	act	within	the	
scope	 of	 their	 employment,	 and	 (2)	 the	 corporation	 must	 be	 an	
intended	 beneficiary	 of	 the	 act.13	 Subsequent	 courts	 have	 interpreted	
these	 elements	 expansively.	 For	 example,	 in	 United States v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp.,14	the	Ninth	Circuit	held	that	the	employee’s	authority	need	
only	be	apparent,	 and	 it	may	be	 found	even	where	 the	employee	acts	
contrary	to	express	company	policy	or	instructions.15	Some	courts	have	
gone	so	far	as	to	find	that	even	criminal	actions	beyond	the	scope	of	an	
employee’s	 real	 or	 apparent	 authority	 might	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	
	
 8. Id.	at	492.	
 9. Id.	at	494–95.	
 10. Id. at	495.	
 11. Id.	
 12. Id.	at	495–96.	
 13. Id.	at	493–96.	
	 14.	 467	F.2d	1000	(9th	Cir.	1973).	See also	United	States	v.	Basic	Constr.	Co.,	711	F.2d	570,	
573	 (4th	 Cir.	 1985)	 (holding	 that	 the	 lower	 court	 properly	 instructed	 the	 jury	 that	 corporate	
intent	can	be	shown	by	the	actions	or	statements	of	those	who	“have	apparent	authority	to	make	
policy	for	the	corporation”	(emphasis	added)).	
 15. Hilton Hotels,	467	F.2d	at	1004;	see also	Basic Constr.,	711	F.2d	at	573	(recognizing	that	a	
corporation	 can	 be	 held	 criminally	 responsible	 even	 when	 an	 employee’s	 acts	 “were	 against	
corporate	policy	or	express	instruction”).	
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corporation	if	management	or	the	board	does	not	take	active	measures	
to	stop	it.16	
The	 test	 for	 whether	 an	 employee’s	 criminal	 act	 was	 “with	 the	
intent	 to	 benefit	 the	 corporation”	 has	 also	 been	 interpreted	 quite	
liberally.17	 The	 employee’s	 action	 need	 not	 actually	 benefit	 the	
corporation	 to	satisfy	 the	 test;18	 it	may	even	prove	detrimental	 to	 the	
corporation.19	It	need	not	even	be	the	case	that	the	employee’s	primary	
intent	 was	 to	 benefit	 the	 firm;20	 acts	 motivated	 principally	 by	 self‐
interest	may	 be	 imputed	 to	 the	 corporation	where	 a	 jury	might	 find	
that	 at	 least	 part	 of	 the	 employee’s	 motivation—“however	
befuddled”—was	 to	 benefit	 the	 corporation.21	 Indeed,	 at	 least	 one	
commentator	 suggests	 that	 corporate	 liability	 may	 be	 found	 where,	
absent	 any	 clear	 intent	 to	 benefit	 the	 firm,	 employees	 could	 have	
reasonably	believed	the	firm	would	benefit.22	
Ultimately,	 the	 two‐part	 New York Central	 test	 for	 corporate	
criminal	liability	has	been	interpreted	so	liberally	by	the	courts	that	it	
has,	 as	 one	 commentator	 puts	 it,	 been	 rendered	 “almost	
	
 16. See, e.g.,	Cont’l	Baking	Co.	v.	United	States,	281	F.2d	137,	149	(6th	Cir.	1960)	(finding	that	
a	 jury	 could	 infer	 the	 employees’	 authority	 when	 their	 superiors	 “failed	 to	 object	 to”	 the	
employees’	 acts);	 see also	 Mark	 A.	 Rush	 &	 Brian	 F.	 Saulnier,	 How Corporations Can Avoid or 
Minimize Federal Criminal Liability for the Illegal Acts of Employees (1999),	 available at	
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/2ddc7f0b‐92d6‐4d25‐b51be845d32b3c01/	
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/98788628‐f44c‐43f4‐aa04‐1e92459b954c/Article_on	
_Corporate_Criminal_Liability.pdf	 (discussing	 how	 courts	 have	 extended	 liability	 to	 instances	
where	employees	acted	outside	the	scope	of	actual	or	apparent	authority	but	those	actions	went	
unchecked,	 “giving	 the	 appearance	 of	 official	 approval”)	 (citing	KATHLEEN	 F.	 BRICKEY,	 CORPORATE	
CRIMINAL	LIABILITY	§	3:07,	at	107	(2d	ed.	1991)).	
 17. See, e.g.,	 Pamela	 H.	 Bucy,	 Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability,	75	MINN.	L.	REV.	1095,	1102–03	(1991)	(discussing	the	requirement	that	a	criminal	act	be	
committed	with	the	intent	to	benefit	the	corporation	and	how	an	act	can	satisfy	that	requirement	
when	the	corporation	received	no	benefit	from	the	offense	and	those	within	the	corporation	were	
unaware	of	the	conduct	when	it	occurred).	
 18. See, e.g.,	 Standard	 Oil	 Co.	 of	 Tex.	 v.	 United	 States,	 307	 F.2d	 120,	 128	 (5th	 Cir.	 1962)	
(stating	that	an	actual	benefit	to	the	corporation	is	not	necessary	to	create	liability).	
	 19.	 United	States	v.	Automated	Med.	Lab.,	Inc.,	770	F.2d	399,	406–07	(4th	Cir.	1985).	
 20. See, e.g.,	Automated Med. Lab.,	 770	 F.2d	 at	 407	 (stating	 that	 liability	 can	 exist	when	 an	
agent	acts	for	both	his	or	her	own	benefit	and	for	the	corporation’s	benefit);	United	States	v.	Gold,	
743	 F.2d	 800,	 823	 (11th	 Cir.	 1984)	 (finding	 that	 an	 employee	must	 only	 intend	 to	 benefit	 the	
corporation	“in	part”);	United	States	v.	Beusch,	596	F.2d	871,	877–78	(9th	Cir.	1979)	(discussing	
the	requirement	of	the	intent	to	benefit	the	corporation).	
	 21.	 United	States	v.	Sun‐Diamond	Growers	of	Cal.,	138	F.3d	961,	970	(D.C.	Cir.	1998).	See also	
Local	1814,	Int’l	Longshoremen’s	Ass’n	v.	NLRB,	735	F.2d	1384,	1395	(D.C.	Cir.	1984)	(“[T]he	acts	
of	 an	 agent	 motivated	 partly	 by	 self‐interest—even	 where	 self‐interest	 is	 the	 predominant	
motive—lie	within	 the	 scope	of	 employment	 so	 long	 as	 the	 agent	 is	 actuated	by	 the	principal’s	
business	purposes	‘to	any	appreciable	extent.’”).	
 22. See, e.g.,	Hasnas,	supra	note	3,	at	1338	(citing	Steere	Tank	Lines	v.	United	States,	330	F.2d	
719,	722–24	(5th	Cir.	1964)	as	holding	that	“a	corporation	could	be	liable	for	the	illegal	actions	of	
truck	drivers	who	reasonably	could	believe	 the	corporation	benefited	 from	and	demanded	such	
actions.”).	
2016]	 Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading 151	
meaningless.”23	The	practical	reality	is	that	whether	a	corporation	is	or	
is	not	charged	for	the	crimes	of	 its	employees	is	 less	a	function	of	the	
two‐part	 New York Central	 test	 than	 it	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 prosecutorial	
whim.24	 This	 breadth	 in	 prosecutorial	 discretion	 leaves	 corporations	
extremely	vulnerable	and	“invites	abuse.”25	
In	 January	 2003,	 the	 then	 Deputy	 Attorney	 General	 Larry	 D.	
Thompson	issued	a	memorandum	(Thompson	Memorandum)	offering	
guidelines	for	prosecutors	in	the	exercise	of	their	discretion	to	charge	a	
corporation	 with	 a	 criminal	 offense.26	 The	 Thompson	 Memorandum	
encouraged	 prosecutors	 to	 consider	 factors	 such	 as	 the	 “nature	 and	
seriousness	 of	 the	 offense,”	 the	 “pervasiveness	 of	wrongdoing	within	
the	 corporation,”	 the	 “adequacy	 of	 the	 corporation’s	 compliance	
program,”	 and	 the	 corporation’s	 “voluntary	 disclosure	 of	wrongdoing	
and	 its	 willingness	 to	 cooperate.”27	 Most	 controversially,	 in	
determining	 whether	 a	 corporation	 was	 willing	 to	 “cooperate,”	 the	
Thompson	 Memorandum	 permitted	 prosecutors	 to	 consider	 (1)	
whether	 a	 firm	 was	 willing	 to	 waive	 its	 “attorney‐client	 and	 work	
product	protection”28	and	(2)	whether	it	has	declined	to	pay	attorneys’	
fees	 for	 implicated	employees.29	These	 latter	 factors	demonstrate	 just	
how	 far	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice	 (DOJ)	 managed	 to	 leverage	 its	
virtually	limitless	discretion	to	prosecute	corporations	and	force	firms	
to	 effectively	 “[sign]	 on	 as	 deputy	 prosecutorial	 agents”	 against	
themselves	and	their	own	employees.30	The	government	may,	however,	
have	become	a	bit	too	greedy	in	pressing	its	advantage.	Backlash	from	
business	 groups,	 civil	 liberties	 organizations,	 and	 judges	 ultimately	
forced	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice	 to	 soften	 its	 stance	 somewhat.31	 In	
	
	 23.	 Bucy,	supra	note	17,	at	1102.	
 24. See	 Sun-Diamond,	 138	 F.3d	 at	 970	 (providing	 “the	 only	 thing	 that	 keeps	 deceived	
corporations	from	being	indicted	for	the	acts	of	their	employee‐deceivers	is	not	some	fixed	rule	of	
law	or	logic	but	simply	the	sound	exercise	of	prosecutorial	discretion”).	See also	Howard	J.	Kaplan,	
Corporate Criminal Liability for Insider Trading,	 ABA	 SECTION	 OF	 LITIGATION	 (December	 4,	 2014),	
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/securities/articles/fall2014‐1114‐corporate‐
criminal‐liability‐insider‐trading.html	(providing	the	same	quotation	from	Sun-Diamond).	
	 25.	 Hasnas,	supra	note	3,	at	1342.	
	 26.	 Memorandum	from	Larry	D.	Thompson,	Deputy	Att’y	Gen.,	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Justice,	to	Heads	
of	 Dep’t	 Components	 &	 All	 U.S.	 Attorneys,	 Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business 
Organizations	(Jan.	20,	2003),	available at	http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/	
migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf	
[hereinafter	Thompson	Memorandum].	
 27. Id.	at	4.	
 28. Id.	
 29. Id.	at	7–8.	
	 30.	 Hasnas,	supra	note	3,	at	1354.	
 31. See, e.g.,	Ashby	Jones,	Thompson	Memo Out, McNulty Memo In,	WALL	ST.	J.	(Dec.	12,	2006),	
available at	 http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/12/12/thompson‐memo‐out‐mcnulty‐memo‐in	
(providing	a	report	on	the	“McNulty	Memorandum”	written	by	U.S.	Deputy	Attorney	General	Paul	
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December	2006,	 then	Deputy	Attorney	General	Paul	 J.	McNulty	 issued	
new	 guidelines	 that,	while	 retaining	most	 of	 the	 same	 language	 from	
the	 Thompson	 Memorandum,	 now	 require	 that	 prosecutors	 seek	
approval	 from	 the	 Deputy	 Attorney	 General	 before	 requesting	 that	
firms	 waive	 privilege	 and	 only	 allow	 consideration	 of	 advancing	
attorneys’	 fees	 for	 employees	 under	 extraordinary	 circumstances.32	
Nevertheless,	 a	 recent	 memorandum	 issued	 by	 Deputy	 Attorney	
General	Sally	Quillian	Yates	 looks	 to	 recover	some	of	 this	 lost	ground	
and	functionally	revive	the	privilege	waiver	demand	by	requiring	that	
entities	 turn	 over	 “all	 relevant	 facts”	 in	 order	 to	 receive	 “any”	
cooperation	credit.33	In	sum,	vast	prosecutorial	discretion	continues	to	
leave	 the	 government	 holding	 all	 the	 cards.	 As	 U.S.	 Attorney	 Preet	
Bharara,	 who	made	 the	 cover	 of	Time Magazine	 in	 2012	 as	 the	man	
who	 is	 “Busting	 Wall	 Street,”	 himself	 put	 it,	 “the	 corporation	 is	
particularly	 ill‐equipped	 to	 defend	 itself	.	.	.	 against	 the	 power	 of	
prosecutors	to	prove	virtually any corporate entity guilty upon showing 
criminal conduct on the part of at least one employee.”34	In	other	words,	
corporations	 have	 no	 choice	 but	 to	 “cooperate,”	 and	 prosecutors	 are	
free	to	decide	what	that	means.35	
Even	 before	 the	 Thompson,	McNulty,	 and	 Yates	Memoranda,	 the	
Federal	 Sentencing	 Guidelines,	 promulgated	 in	 1991,	 imposed	
essentially	 the	same	 incentive	structure	on	corporations	 to	self‐police	
and	 “cooperate”	 with	 the	 government.	 Under	 the	 Sentencing	
Guidelines,	 a	 corporation	 reduces	 its	 culpability	 score	by	maintaining	
“effective	 compliance	 and	 ethics	 programs,”	 and	 by	 “self‐reporting,	
cooperation,	 or	 acceptance	 of	 responsibility.”36	 Though	 these	 credits	
	
J.	McNulty	to	supplement	the	Thompson	Memorandum).	See also	United	States	v.	Stein,	541	F.3d	
130,	136	(2d	Cir.	2008)	(finding	the	defendants	not	guilty	and	instead	ruling	that	the	government	
had	an	“overwhelming	influence”).	
	 32.	 Memorandum	 from	Paul	 J.	McNulty,	Deputy	Att’y	Gen.,	U.S.	Dep’t	 of	 Justice,	 to	Heads	 of	
Dep’t	Components	&	All	U.S.	Attorneys,	Principles of Federal Prosecutions of Business Organizations 
(Dec.	12,	2006),	available at	http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2007/07/	
05/mcnulty_memo.pdf	[hereinafter	McNulty	Memorandum].	
	 33.	 Memorandum	from	Sally	Quillian	Yates,	Deputy	Att’y	Gen.,	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Justice,	to	Heads	of	
Dep’t	Components	&	All	U.S.	Attorneys,	Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing at 3–4	
(Sept.	 9,	 2015)	 available at	 https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download	 [hereinafter	
Yates	Memorandum].	
	 34.	 Preet	 Bharara,	 Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking 
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants,	44	AM.	CRIM.	L.	REV.	53,	70–71	(2007)	(emphasis	
added).	
 35. See generally	 Lisa	 Kern	 Griffin,	 Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal 
Procedure,	 82	 N.Y.U.	 L.	 REV.	 311	 (2007)	 (examining	 the	 constitutional	 implications	 of	 the	
corporate	cooperation	doctrine).	
	 36.	 U.S.	SENTENCING	GUIDELINES	MANUAL	§	8A1.1,	at	499,	§	8B2.1	at	509	(2015);	see also	Ellen	S.	
Podgor,	Educating Compliance,	 46	AM.	 CRIM.	 L.	 REV.	 1523,	1528	n.37	 (2009)	 (elaborating	on	 the	
ways	that	a	corporation	can	reduce	capability	through	the	Sentencing	Guidelines).	
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under	 the	 Sentencing	 Guidelines	 are	 offered	 in	 the	 form	 of	 post‐
conviction	 carrots,	 they	 end	 up	 functioning	 as	 hefty	 pre‐indictment	
sticks	when	 coupled	with	 limitless	prosecutorial	 discretion	under	 the	
courts’	 liberal	 interpretations	 of	New York Central.	 These	 Sentencing	
Guidelines,	 like	 the	 above‐described	 DOJ	 memoranda,	 effectively	
deputize	corporations	against	their	employees	and	themselves.37	
But	 recall	 that	 the	 guiding	 policy	 behind	 New York Central’s	
recognition	 of	 corporate	 criminal	 liability	 was	 to	 fill	 an	 enforcement	
gap—to	 create	 otherwise	 absent	 incentives	 for	 firms	 to	 police	 the	
conduct	of	their	own	employees.	In	other	words,	effectively	deputizing	
firms	 to	 perform	 a	 law‐enforcement	 function	 was	 precisely	 the	
Supreme	 Court’s	 objective.	 Presumably	 the	 idea	 was	 that	 the	 clear	
benefits	of	increased	enforcement	would	outweigh	the	inevitable	harm	
of	 punishing	 innocent	 shareholders.	 Even	 keeping	 this	 broad	 policy	
justification	 in	 mind,	 however,	 corporate	 criminal	 liability	 in	 the	
context	of	insider	trading	presents	some	unique	problems.	
III. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR INSIDER TRADING: THE 
PERFECT STORM 
The	crime	of	insider	trading	has	never	been	defined	by	statute	or	
by	 rule.	 Congress	 and	 the	 SEC	 have	 elected	 to	 allow	 the	 definition	 of	
insider	 trading	 to	 develop	 through	 the	 courts	 and	 administrative	
proceedings.	 The	 primary	 statutory	 authority	 for	 insider	 trading	
liability	is	Section	10(b)	of	the	Securities	Exchange	Act	of	1934,38	which	
is	implemented	by	the	SEC	in	Exchange	Act	Rule	10b–5.39	Section	10(b)	
prohibits	the	employment	of	“any	manipulative	or	deceptive	device	or	
contrivance”	 in	 “connection	 with	 the	 purchase	 or	 sale	 of	 any	
security.”40	 Though	 Congress	 intended	 Section	 10(b)	 as	 a	 “catchall”	
provision,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 held	 that	 “what	 it	 catches	must	 be	
fraud.”41	 Insider	 traders,	 however,	 typically	 gain	 their	 trading	
advantage	by	failing	to	disclose	material	nonpublic	information,	not	by	
making	 affirmative	misrepresentations.	 Under	 the	 common	 law,	 such	
trading	 is	 fraudulent	 only	 where	 there	 is	 a	 duty	 to	 disclose.42	 The	
	
 37. See, e.g.,	Hasnas,	supra	note	3,	at	1354	(“[T]he	New York Central	standard	brings	almost	
irresistible	pressure	on	corporations	to	do	whatever	they	can	to	avoid	indictment,	which	means	
signing	on	as	deputy	prosecutorial	agents.”	(footnote	omitted)).	
	 38.	 15	U.S.C.	§	78j(b)	(2012).	
	 39.	 17	C.F.R.	§	240.10b5–1	(2014).	
	 40.	 15	U.S.C.	§	78j(b).	
	 41.	 Chiarella	v.	United	States,	445	U.S.	222,	234–35	(1980).	
 42. Id.	at	228	(quoting	RESTATEMENT	(SECOND)	OF	TORTS	§	551(2)(a)	(1977)).	
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Supreme	 Court	 has	 recognized	 two	 theories	 whereby	 Section	 10(b)	
insider	 trading	 liability	 will	 result	 from	 a	 failure	 to	 disclose:	 (1)	 the	
“classical	 theory,”	 which	 addresses	 true	 insider	 trading	 (trading	 by	
issuers,	 their	 employees,	 or	 persons	 otherwise	 affiliated	 with	 the	
issuer);	and	(2)	the	“misappropriation	theory,”	which	is	broad	enough	
to	address	outsider	trading	(trading	by	persons	who	are	not	affiliated	
with	the	issuer).43	
Liability	is	incurred	under	the	classical	theory	where	the	issuer,	its	
employee,	 or	 someone	 otherwise	 affiliated	 with	 the	 issuer	 seeks	 to	
benefit	 from	 trading	 (or	 tipping	 others	who	 trade)	 that	 firm’s	 shares	
based	 on	material	 nonpublic	 information.	 Here	 the	 insider	 violates	 a	
“fiduciary	 or	 other	 similar	 relation	 of	 trust	 and	 confidence”	 to	 the	
current	 or	 prospective	 shareholder	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	
transaction.44	 Under	 the	 misappropriation	 theory,	 Section	 10(b)	
liability	 is	 incurred	 where	 one	 misappropriates	 material	 nonpublic	
information	 and,	 unbeknownst	 to	 the	 source,	 seeks	 to	 benefit	 by	
trading	 (or	 tipping	 others	who	 trade)	 on	 this	 information.	While	 the	
classical	 theory	 finds	 the	 trader’s	 duty	 to	 disclose	 in	 a	 fiduciary	
relationship	with	the	counterparty	to	the	trade,	“the	misappropriation	
theory	 premises	 liability	 on	 a	 fiduciary‐turned‐trader’s	 deception	 of	
those	who	 entrusted	 him	with	 access	 to	 confidential	 information”	 by	
cheating	them	“of	the	exclusive	use	of	that	information.”45	
Section	 10(b)	 is	 not	 a	 criminal	 statute,	 but	 Section	 32(a)	 of	 the	
Exchange	 Act	 makes	 any	 willful	 violation	 of	 the	 Act	 a	 crime.	 Under	
Section	32(a),	
Any	person	who	willfully	violates	any	provision	of	 this	chapter,	or	
any	 rule	 or	 regulation	 thereunder	 the	 violation	 of	 which	 is	 made	
unlawful	or	the	observance	of	which	is	required	under	the	terms	of	
this	 chapter	.	.	.	 shall	 upon	 conviction	be	 fined	not	more	 than	 [five	
million	 dollars]	 or	 imprisoned	 not	 more	 than	 [twenty]	 years,	 or	
both,	except	that	when	such	person	is	a	person	other	than	a	natural	
person,	 a	 fine	 not	 exceeding	 [twenty‐five	 million	 dollars]	 may	 be	
imposed.46	
These	criminal	penalties	are	stiff.	And,	in	addition,	the	Insider	Trading	
and	 Securities	 Enforcement	 Act	 of	 1988	 (ITSFEA)	 extended	 the	 civil	
	
 43. See United	 States	 v.	 O’Hagan,	 521	 U.S.	 642,	 651–53	 (1997)	 (describing	 the	 differences	
between	the	classical	theory	and	the	misappropriation	theory).	
 44. Chiarella,	445	U.S.	at	228.	
 45. O’Hagan,	521	U.S.	at	652.	
	 46.	 15	U.S.C.	§	78ff(a).	
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penalty	 of	 treble	damages—once	 reserved	 to	 individual	 traders47—to	
“controlling	persons.”48	When	 the	prosecutor’s	 complete	discretion	 to	
charge	corporations	for	any	and	all	insider	trading	by	their	employees	
under	New York Central	and	its	progeny	is	combined	with	the	threat	of	
these	 considerable	 sanctions,	 corporations’	 incentives	 to	 self‐police—
for	 example,	 by	 implementing	 strong	 insider	 trading	 compliance	
programs—is	obvious.	
But	 there	 is	 a	 problem	 that	 renders	 firms	 even	more	 helpless	 at	
the	hands	of	prosecutors	when	facing	potential	insider	trading	liability.	
Both	 the	 classical	 and	 misappropriation	 theories	 of	 insider	 trading	
liability	 involve	 persons	 who	 seek	 to	 “benefit”	 from	 trading	 “on	 the	
basis	of”	“material”	“nonpublic”	information	in	violation	of	a	“fiduciary	
or	other	similar	relation	of	trust	and	confidence,”	but	no	one	seems	to	
agree	on	a	clear	definition	of	any	one	of	these	terms.49	Though	the	SEC	
and	Congress	have	had	ample	opportunity	to	bring	clarity	to	the	law	by	
promulgating	 a	 statutory	 or	 rule‐based	 definition	 of	 insider	 trading,	
they	 have	 expressly	 declined	 to	 do	 so	 for	 fear	 that	 it	 would	 deprive	
prosecutors	 and	 regulators	 of	 necessary	 flexibility	 in	 enforcement.50	
The	 result	 is	 a	 perfect	 storm	 for	 corporations.	 They	 cannot	 avoid	
liability	 for	 the	 insider	 trading	 of	 their	 employees,	 but	 they	 cannot	
prevent	it	through	effective	compliance	programs	because	they	do	not	
have	a	clear	idea	of	what	it	is	they	are	supposed	to	prevent.	
This	 problem	 is	 particularly	 acute	 for	 issuers,	 who	 often	
compensate	 their	 employees	 with	 firm	 shares	 and	 therefore	 must	
provide	those	employees	with	some	opportunity	to	sell	 their	shares.	 I	
have	 described	 this	 problem	 elsewhere	 as	 the	 “paradox	 of	 insider	
trading	 compliance.”51	 But	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	 problem	 with	 insider	
trading	 liability	 for	 corporations;	 it	 also	has	 the	defect	 of	 often	being	
completely	incoherent.	
	
 47. See	WILLAM	K.S.	WANG	&	MARC	I.	STIENBERG,	INSIDER	TRADING	812	(3d	ed.	2010).	
	 48.	 Insider	Trading	and	Securities	Fraud	Enforcement	Act	of	1988,	Pub.	L.	No.	100–704,	102	
Stat.	4677	(codified	in	scattered	sections	of	15	U.S.C.	§	78	(2012)).	
 49. See, e.g.,	John	P.	Anderson,	Solving the Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance,	88	TEMPLE	L.	
REV.	 273,	 278–87	 (2016)	 (elaborating	 on	 the	 absence	 of	 definitions	 for	 the	 elements	 of	 insider	
trading	 but	 instead	 calling	 for	 not	 only	 definitions,	 but	 the	 current	 enforcement	 regime	 to	 be	
liberalized	generally).	
 50. See, e.g.,	 STEPHEN	 BAINBRIDGE,	 INSIDER	 TRADING:	 LAW	 AND	 POLICY	 145	 n.30	 (2014)	 (“The	
[House]	 committee	 feared	 that	 any	 definition	 would	 have	 to	 be	 either	 so	 broad	 as	 to	 be	
unworkable	or	so	narrow	as	to	reduce	the	SEC’s	and	the	court’s	flexibility	to	address	new	forms	of	
trading.”).	
 51. See Anderson,	 supra	 note	 49,	 at	 295–96	 (“This	 is	 the	 paradox	 of	 insider	 trading	
compliance	 for	 issuers:	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 law	combined	with	 the	 threat	of	 stiff	 reputational	 and	
legal	 sanctions	 creates	 a	 perverse	 incentive	 to	 adopt	 compliance	 programs	 that	 are	 highly	
inefficient	and	ultimately	costly	to	shareholders.”	(citations	omitted)).	
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IV. DOES IT MAKE SENSE? 
There	is	a	great	deal	of	controversy	over	whether	insider	trading	
is	a	victimless	crime.	I	think	the	answer	is	that	insider	trading	does	not	
have	 to	 create	 victims.	Under	 a	 different	 insider	 trading	 enforcement	
regime,	 some	 forms	 of	 insider	 trading	 would	 be	 both	 morally	
permissible	 and	 economically	 beneficial	 for	 society	 as	 a	whole.52	 But	
that	 is	 not	 the	 regime	 under	 which	 we	 live.	 The	 current	 regime—
irrational	and	inefficient	as	it	is—has	created	market	expectations	that	
are	disappointed	by	insider	trading.	The	victims	of	insider	trading	are	
not	 always	 the	 counterparties	 to	 the	 insider’s	 transactions;	 they	 vary	
depending	on	the	type	of	 insider	trading	that	occurs.	This	Part	begins	
by	 identifying	the	different	victims	that	 the	 law	 identifies	as	resulting	
from	 the	 various	 categories	 of	 insider	 trading	 under	 the	 current	 U.S.	
enforcement	 regime.	 Identifying	 these	 victims	 of	 insider	 trading	
exposes	 an	 absurdity	 in	 the	 context	 of	 corporate	 criminal	 liability.	 It	
turns	 out	 that	 in	most	 (though	 not	 all)	 cases	where	 a	 corporation	 is	
subject	 to	 criminal	 liability	 for	 the	 insider	 trading	of	 its	 employees,	 it	
(or	its	shareholders)	is	by	theory	of	law	also	the	principal	victim	of	that	
same	trading.	This	leads	to	the	absurd	result	that	the	victim	is	liable	for	
the	crime.	
A. Victim	of	True	Insider	Trading	Under	the	Classical	Theory 
As	 noted	 above,	 under	 the	 classical	 theory,	 when	 a	 true	 insider	
(whether	 the	 issuer	 itself,	 a	 board	member,	 senior	management,	 or	 a	
low‐level	 employee)	 profits	 by	 trading	 in	 the	 firm’s	 shares	 based	 on	
material	 nonpublic	 information,	 the	 fraud	 is	 perpetrated	 on	 the	
counterparty.53	In	such	cases,	the	counterparty	will	always	be	a	current	
or	prospective	shareholder	who,	as	such,	is	owed	a	fiduciary	or	similar	
duty	of	trust	and	confidence	that	warrants	disclosure	prior	to	trading.	
The	 insider	 profits	 by	 deception,	 and	 the	 current	 or	 prospective	
shareholder	with	whom	she	trades	is	the	victim	of	this	deception.	
As	 noted	 above,	 corporate	 criminal	 liability	 exposes	 firms	 to	
astronomical	 monetary	 fines.54	 Moreover,	 history	 suggests	 that	 the	
	
 52. See, e.g.,	 John	P.	Anderson,	Greed, Envy, and the Criminalization of Insider Trading,	 2014	
UTAH	 L.	 REV.	 1	 (2014);	 see also John	 P.	 Anderson,	 What’s the Harm in Issuer-Licensed Insider 
Trading?,	 69	 U.	 MIAMI	 L.	 REV.	 795	 (2015)	 (arguing	 that	 “non‐promissory”	 or	 “issuer‐licensed”	
insider	trading	is	morally	permissible	under	the	right	conditions,	and	that	permitting	such	trading	
would	likely	improve	market	efficiency).	
 53. Supra	Part	III.	
 54. Id.	
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uncertainty	 accompanying	 a	 criminal	 indictment	 alone	 can	 cause	 a	
corporation’s	sources	of	capital	to	evaporate,	ultimately	resulting	in	the	
firm’s	collapse.55	Who	suffers	these	consequences?	As	Professor	Hasnas	
explains,	 “To	 the	 extent	 that	 such	 a	 loss	 cannot	 be	 passed	 along	 to	
consumers,	 it	 is	 the	owners	of	 the	corporation,	 the	shareholders,	who	
incur	 the	 penalty.”56	 But,	 while	 almost	 all	 corporate	 criminal	 liability	
forces	 innocent	 shareholders	 to	 bear	 the	 punishment,57	 the	 case	 of	
insider	trading	is	unique	in	that,	as	demonstrated	above,	the	theory	of	
criminal	 liability	 itself	 also	 identifies	 these	 same	 shareholders	 as	 the	
victims.58	Consequently,	shareholders	are	forced	to	suffer	the	crime	and	
the	punishment!	
Recall	 that	 in	 New York Central,	 the	 Court	 weighed	 the	 concern	
that	 imposing	 corporate	 criminal	 liability	 might	 sometimes	 force	
innocent	 shareholders	 to	 pay	 a	 price	 for	 the	 corporation’s	 crimes.59	
With	this	concern	in	mind,	the	Court	nevertheless	held	that	corporate	
criminal	liability	may	still	be	warranted	in	those	cases	where	no	other	
effective	 means	 of	 protecting	 the	 public	 are	 available.60	 The	 Court	
presumably	 reasoned	 that	 in	 such	 cases,	 the	 wrong	 of	 penalizing	
innocent	 shareholders	 was	 outweighed	 by	 the	 wrong	 of	 leaving	
innocent	 victims	 unprotected	 or	 by	 the	 wrong	 of	 undermining	 the	
policy	 advanced	 by	 the	 relevant	 statute.61	 But	 this	 rationale	 cannot	
justify	 corporate	 criminal	 liability	 for	 true	 insider	 trading	 under	 the	
classical	theory.	Imposing	harsh	penalties	on	the	innocent	shareholders	
whom	the	theory	of	liability	also	identifies	as	the	victims	of	the	crime	is	
just	plain	absurd,	and	it	does	not	jibe	with	the	Court’s	reasoning	in	New 
York Central.	
B. Victim	of	True	Insider	Trading	Under	the	Misappropriation	Theory 
As	a	number	of	scholars	have	pointed	out,	there	is	no	reason	that	
true	insiders	cannot	also	incur	Section	10(b)	liability	for	insider	trading	
	
	 55.	 Witness	the	collapse	of	Drexel	Burnham	Lambert	in	the	1980s	and	the	collapse	of	Arthur	
Anderson	in	the	wake	of	the	Enron	scandal	of	2001.	See, e.g.,	JAMES	B.	STEWART,	THE	DEN	OF	THIEVES	
(1991,	2010)	(chronicling	the	demise	of	Drexel	Burnham	Lambert).	
	 56.	 Hasnas,	supra	note	3,	at	1339.	
 57. Id.	(“The	defining	characteristic	of	the	modern	corporation	is	the	separation	of	ownership	
and	control.	The	shareholders	.	.	.	have	no	direct	control	over	or	knowledge	of	the	behavior	of	the	
corporate	employees	who	commit	the	criminal	offenses.”).	
 58. Supra	Part	III.	
 59. Supra	Part	II.	
 60. Id.	
 61. Id.	
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based	on	the	misappropriation	theory.62	As	Professor	Donna	Nagy	puts	
it,	 “Although	 O’Hagan	 depicted	 its	 misappropriation	 theory	 as	 a	
‘complement’	to	the	classical	theory,	there	is	no	reason	for	eschewing	a	
misappropriation	 analysis	 simply	 because	 an	 insider	 owes	 disclosure	
duties	to	the	corporation’s	shareholders	as	well	[as	to]	the	corporation	
that	entrusted	him	with	the	information.”63	When	a	true	insider	incurs	
Section	10(b)	 liability	under	the	misappropriation	theory,	the	 fraud	is	
actually	 perpetrated	 on	 the	 issuer.	 The	O’Hagan	 Court	 explained	 that	
“[a]	 company’s	 confidential	 information	.	.	.	 qualifies	 as	 property	 to	
which	 the	 company	 has	 a	 right	 of	 exclusive	 use.	 The	 undisclosed	
misappropriation	 of	 such	 information,	 in	 violation	 of	 a	 fiduciary	
duty	.	.	.	constitutes	fraud	akin	to	embezzlement.”64	
The	 incoherence	of	 derivative	 corporate	 criminal	 liability	 for	 the	
true	 insider	 trading	 of	 its	 employees	 under	 the	 misappropriation	
theory	 is	 even	 more	 blatant	 than	 under	 the	 classical	 theory.	 The	
absurdity	 of	 holding	 a	 firm	 criminally	 liable	 for	 its	 employees’	
embezzlement	is	palpable,	but	this	is	precisely	what	corporate	criminal	
liability	for	true	insider	trading	amounts	to	under	the	misappropriation	
theory.	 Certainly	 the	 policy	 rational	 behind	New York Central	 cannot	
support	corporate	criminal	liability	under	such	circumstances.	
C. Victim	of	Source‐Employee	Outsider	Trading	Under	the	
Misappropriation	Theory 
The	Supreme	Court	 first	 recognized	 the	misappropriation	 theory	
to	fill	a	gap	in	the	classical	theory’s	coverage—namely	that	it	 failed	to	
capture	outsiders	who	look	to	profit	by	trading	on	material,	nonpublic	
information	 in	 breach	 of	 a	 fiduciary	 or	 similar	 duty	 of	 trust	 and	
	
 62. See, e.g.,	DONALD	C.	LANGEVOORT,	 INSIDER	TRADING:	REGULATION,	ENFORCEMENT	&	PREVENTION	
§	6‐1	(West	vol.	18,	2015)	(“Virtually	all	cases	that	could	be	brought	[under	the	classical	theory]	
can	also	be	styled	as	misappropriation	cases.”);	WANG	&	STEINBERG,	supra	note	47,	at	492	(“In	most	
instances,	both	the	Commission	and	private	plaintiffs	could	recast	a	classical	special	relationship	
case	as	involving	‘misappropriation.’”).	
	 63.	 Donna	 M.	 Nagy,	 Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading,	 42	 J.	 CORP.	 L.	
(forthcoming	Fall	2016)	(manuscript	at	21–22),	available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers	
.cfm?abstract_id=2665820.	 Indeed,	 Professor	Nagy	 suggests	 that	misappropriation	may	 become	
the	theory	of	liability	de jour	for	the	SEC	and	prosecutors	in	even	true	insider	trading	cases	if	the	
Second	Circuit’s	decision	 in	United	States	v.	Newman,	773	F.3d	438	(2d	Cir.	2014)	stands.	 Id.	at	
24–26.	 Nagy	 points	 out	 that	 the	 misappropriation	 theory	 as	 articulated	 in	 O’Hagan	 and	 other	
cases	may	 not	 require	 the	 same	 showing	of	 a	quid pro quo	 to	 establish	 the	benefit	 element	 for	
insider	trading	liability.	Id. at	20–22.	Though	the	Supreme	Court	denied	certiorari	on	Newman,	84	
USLW	3064	(Oct.	5,	2015),	it	has	since	granted	certiorari	in	another	tipper/tippee	insider	trading	
case,	United	States	v.	Salman,	792	F.3d	1087	(9th	Cir.	2015).	
 64. United	States	v.	O’Hagan,	521	U.S.	642,	654	(1997)	(citations	omitted).	
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confidence.65	 The	 O’Hagan	 Court	 held	 that	 since	 the	 impact	 on	 the	
parties	and	the	market	is	the	same	in	both	cases,	it	makes	little	sense	to	
hold	a	lawyer,	like	O’Hagan,	liable	under	section	10(b)	if	he	works	for	a	
law	 firm	representing	 the	 target	of	a	 takeover	(as	he	would	be	under	
the	classical	theory),	but	not	if	he	works	for	the	bidder.66	
This	Part	focuses	on	“source‐employee”	outsider	trading	under	the	
misappropriation	theory.	Here	the	outsider	misappropriation	trading	is	
done	by	an	employee	of	the	information’s	source.	Such	insider	trading	
is	 perpetrated	 by	 an	 employee	 against	 his	 employer.67	 Take,	 for	
example,	 the	 case	 of	Carpenter v. United States.68	 In	 that	 case,	 a	Wall 
Street Journal	(Journal)	reporter	was	prosecuted	for	trading	in	advance	
of	the	publication	of	his	daily	stock‐picking	column.69	The	column	was	
popular	and	usually	had	an	impact	on	stock	prices.	The	Journal’s	policy	
was	 that,	 prior	 to	 publication,	 the	 content	 of	 the	 column	 was	 the	
Journal’s	 confidential	 information.70	 In	 violation	 of	 this	 policy,	 the	
reporter,	 R.	 Foster	Winans,	 entered	 into	 an	 arrangement	whereby	he	
and	others	would	profit	 by	 trading	 on	 this	 information	 in	 advance	of	
publication.71	Under	 the	New York Central	 test,	 there	 is	nothing	other	
than	the	exercise	of	prosecutorial	discretion	that	prevented	the	Journal	
from	 being	 indicted	 for	 Winan’s	 trading.	 This,	 as	 Professor	 Macey	
points	out,	is	“ironic	in	light	of	the	fact	that	the	Supreme	Court	‘went	to	
great	 lengths	 to	 indicate	 that	 the	 [Journal]	 had	 been	 victimized	 by	
Winans	and	his	cohorts.’”72	
	
 65. Id. at	659.	
 66. Id.	
	 67.	 The	facts	of	Chiarella	v.	United	States	offer	an	example.	445	U.S.	222	(1980).	In	that	case,	
the	mark‐up	man	for	a	financial	printer	learned	the	identities	of	takeover	targets	in	advance	of	the	
market.	 Id.	 He	 then	 profited	 on	 this	 nonpublic	 information	 by	 purchasing	 shares	 in	 the	 target	
companies	in	advance	of	the	public	announcements.	Id.	at	224.	Though	the	Supreme	Court	had	not	
recognized	 the	 misappropriation	 theory	 at	 the	 time	 Chiarella	 was	 decided,	 these	 facts	 would	
support	 liability	 under	 the	misappropriation	 theory	 because	 Chiarella	 breached	 a	 duty	 of	 trust	
and	confidence	to	his	employer	in	using	the	information	to	trade.	Id.	The	facts	in	O’Hagan,	the	case	
in	 which	 the	 Court	 expressly	 recognized	 the	 misappropriation	 theory,	 involved	 a	 partner’s	
misappropriation	of	information	concerning	a	takeover	bid	from	his	law	firm.	O’Hagan,	521	U.S.	at	
648.	Based	on	this	nonpublic	information,	O’Hagan	acquired	positions	in	the	target	company	and	
profited	by	over	four	million	dollars	when	the	takeover	was	announced. Id.	
	 68.	 484	U.S.	19	(1987).	
 69. Id.	at	22–23.	
 70. Id.	at	23.	
 71. Id.	Carpenter	was	convicted	under	federal	mail	and	wire	fraud	statutes,	as	well	as	under	
the	misappropriation	theory	of	Section	10(b)	liability.	On	appeal,	the	Supreme	Court	was	evenly	
divided	with	respect	to	the	convictions	pursuant	to	the	misappropriation	theory	of	10(b)	liability.	
Id.	at	24.	Thus,	while	 the	 lower	court’s	 judgment	was	affirmed,	 the	misappropriation	theory	did	
not	become	Supreme	Court	precedent	until	O’Hagan	was	decided	ten	years	later.	
	 72.	 MACEY,	supra	note	1,	at	65–66	(quoting	Pitt	&	Shapiro,	supra	note	2,	at	240–41,	n.388).	
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D. Victim	of	Third‐Party	Insider/Outsider	Trading	
What	 I	 shall	 refer	 to	 as	 “third‐party”	 insider	 or	 outsider	 trading	
occurs	 where	 the	 violation	 of	 fiduciary	 or	 similar	 duty	 of	 trust	 and	
confidence	 that	 makes	 the	 trading	 fraudulent	 is	 committed	 against	
someone	 other	 than	 the	 trader’s	 employer	 or	 shareholders	 in	 the	
trader’s	 firm.	Third‐party	traders	are	sometimes	tippees,	who	may	be	
held	derivatively	 liable	under	either	 the	classical	or	misappropriation	
theories	 of	 liability.73	 But	 third‐party	 traders	 might	 also	 be	 directly	
liable	under	the	misappropriation	theory	where	they	trade	in	violation	
of	a	fiduciary	or	similar	duty	of	trust	and	confidence	to	a	third	party.74	
For	 purposes	 of	 this	 Article,	 I	 am	 only	 concerned	 with	 third‐party	
traders	whose	trading	might	somehow	be	interpreted	as	being	within	
the	 scope	 of	 their	 employment	 and	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 their	 employer	
under	New York Central.75	 Third‐party	 traders	 fitting	 this	 description	
are	typically	employed	within	the	financial	industry.	
Imagine	that	Timmy,	a	trader	for	the	hedge	fund	ABC	Capital,	pays	
an	 insider	 at	 Big‐Strike	 Mining	 Corporation	 for	 material,	 nonpublic	
information	concerning	the	company’s	recent	discovery	of	a	major	gold	
deposit	 in	North	Dakota.	Timmy	purchases	 all	 the	ABC	 shares	he	 can	
get	 his	 hands	 on	 for	 ABC	 Capital.	 ABC	 makes	 millions	 after	 the	
announcement,	 and	 Timmy	 receives	 a	 generous	 bonus.	 Who	 are	 the	
victims	 of	 Timmy’s	 insider	 trading?	 As	 explained	 above,	 under	 the	
classical	 theory,	 the	counterparties	to	the	trading	are	the	victims,	and	
under	the	misappropriation	theory,	Big	Strike	is	the	victim.	ABC	Capital	
is	not	a	victim	under	either	theory.	Moreover,	Timmy’s	trades	benefited	
ABC	 and	 were	 squarely	 within	 his	 scope	 of	 employment	 under	 New 
York Central.	Consequently,	by	contrast	to	the	trading	analyzed	in	Parts	
IV(A),76	 IV(B),77	 and	 IV(C)78	 above,	 holding	 ABC	 Capital	 derivatively	
	
 73. See, e.g.,	Dirks	v.	 SEC,	463	U.S.	646,	659–60	 (1982)	 (discussing	 tippee	 liability).	Though	
Dirks	addressed	tipper/tippee	liability	under	the	classical	theory,	subsequent	cases	make	it	clear	
that	the	same	derivative	liability	applies	in	the	misappropriation	context	as	well.	See, e.g.,	J.	Kelly	
Strader,	(Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading,	80	BROOK.	L.	REV.	1419,	1435	(2015)	(applying	Dirks	
to	misappropriation	cases).	
	 74.	 The	recent	 indictment	of	Tiger	Asia	Management	LLC	offers	an	example.	See, e.g.,	David	
Voreacos,	 Tiger Asia Admits Guilt in $60 Million Court Settlement,	 BLOOMBERG	 (Dec.	 13,	 2012),	
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012‐12‐12/tiger‐asia‐management‐hedge‐fund‐
said‐to‐plan‐guilty‐plea.	
	 75.	 For	example,	even	under	the	most	liberal	interpretation,	the	New York Central	test	would	
not	license	derivative	corporate	liability	for	Dunkin’	Donuts	when	one	of	its	employees	trades	in	
Apple	shares	based	on	an	illegal	tip	from	an	insider	at	Apple.	
 76. Supra	Part	IV(A).	
 77. Supra	Part	IV(B).	
 78. Supra	Part	IV(C).	
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liable	under	Section	10(b)	for	Timmy’s	insider	trading	does	not	suffer	
the	irony	of	holding	the	victim	liable	for	the	crime.	
Moreover,	consider	the	ABC	Capital	example	above	in	light	of	the	
policy	considerations	informing	New York Central.	Despite	the	risk	that	
corporate	criminal	liability	will	often	punish	innocent	shareholders	for	
the	 crimes	 of	 the	 firm’s	 employees,	 the	 Court	 held	 that	 such	 liability	
was	 warranted	 where,	 absent	 the	 incentives	 for	 self‐regulation	
imposed	by	the	threat	of	corporate	criminal	liability,	there	would	be	no	
other	effective	means	of	protecting	the	public	from	morally	hazardous	
incentives	 set	 by	 the	 corporation.79	 This	 is	 precisely	 the	 situation	
presented	by	third‐party	trading	through	hedge	funds	like	ABC	Capital	
and	 other	 financial	 service	 firms.	 The	 recent	 example	 of	 SAC	 Capital	
and	 its	 founder	 Steve	 Cohen	 (dubbed	 “the	 king	 of	 hedge	 funds”80)	 is	
instructive.	
As	Professor	Joan	MacLeod	Heminway	puts	 it,	 in	“terms	of	actual	
knowledge,	SAC’s	business	model	may	have	kept	Cohen	purposefully	in	
the	dark	about	the	origins	of	information	possessed	by	his	analysts	and	
traders.”81	When	you	combine	SAC’s	strict	stated	policy	against	insider	
trading	 and	 large	 compliance	 department82	 with	 its	 extensive	 use	 of	
“expert	 networks”83	 and	 the	 “mosaic	 theory”84	 to	 inform	 trading	
decisions,	Cohen,	the	firm’s	principal,	may	have	constructed	a	virtually	
impregnable	 institutional	 shield	 of	 plausible	 deniability.	 From	behind	
this	 shield,	 Cohen	was	 then	 free	 to	 pressure	 and	 lavishly	 incentivize	
SAC’s	 traders	 to	 “develop	 an	 edge	with	 information	 that	 no	 one	 else	
had”	 or	 risk	 termination.85	 Heminway	 suggests	 that	 the	 doctrine	 of	
willful	blindness	might	offer	an	avenue	to	tippee	liability	for	principals	
like	 Cohen,	 but	 its	 “elements	 may	 be	 difficult	 for	 public	 and	 private	
enforcement	 agents	 to	 prove.	 And	 the	 relevant	 facts	 may	 be	 easy	 to	
manipulate	 to	 the	 advantage	 of	 putative	 tippees.”86	 The	 result	 at	 SAC	
was	that,	 though	a	number	of	employees	were	 indicted	and	convicted	
	
 79. N.Y.	Cent.	&	Hudson	River	R.R.	Co.	v.	United	States,	212	U.S.	481,	495–99	(1909).	
	 80.	 Frances	 E.	 Chapman,	 Marianne	 Jennings	 &	 Lauren	 Tarasuk,	 SAC Capital: Firm Criminal 
Liability, Civil Fines, and the Insulated CEO,	4	AM.	U.	BUS.	L.	REV.	441,	443	(2015).	
	 81.	 Joan	MacLeod	Heminway,	Willful Blindness, Plausible Deniability and Tippee Liability: SAC, 
Steven Cohen, and the Court’s Opinion in Dirks,	 15	 TRANSACTIONS	 TENN.	 J.	 BUS.	 L.	 47,	 51	 (2013).	
Heminway	 goes	 on,	 “[I]t	 may	 be	 that	 fund	 principals	 like	 Cohen	 can	 construct	 an	 information	
gathering	 and	 trading	 operation	 that	 relies	 on	 the	 willful	 blindness	 of	 the	 principals,	 enabling	
them	to	avoid	insider	trading	liability	as	tippees.”	Id.	at	54.	
	 82.	 Chapman,	Jennings	&	Tarasuk,	supra	note	80,	at	447.	
	 83.	 Heminway,	supra	note	81,	at	50.	
	 84.	 CHARLES	GASPARINO,	CIRCLE	OF	FRIENDS	94	(2013).	
 85. Id.	at	206.	
	 86.	 Heminway,	supra	note	81,	at	56.	
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of	 insider	 trading,	 Cohen	 was	 effectively	 “untouchable.”87	 As	 other	
scholars	 put	 it,	 the	 law	 allows	 someone	 like	 Cohen	 “to	 set	 up	 an	
operation	in	which	they	shield	themselves	from	liability.	They	can	pay	
their	fines,	pay	their	employees’	legal	fees,	and	still	have	a	corporation	
left	to	manage	their	personal	fortune.”88	It	turned	out	that	the	only	way	
to	penetrate	this	“tight‐knit	circle	of	greed”89	and	reach	Cohen	himself	
was	to	indict	SAC	Capital,	and	the	DOJ	did	just	that	in	July	of	2013.90	It	is	
precisely	 this	 type	 of	 situation	 that	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 had	 in	 mind	
when	it	recognized	corporate	criminal	liability	in	New York Central.	In	
sum,	if	corporate	criminal	liability	for	insider	trading	is	ever	justified,	it	
is	 justified	 in	 these	 circumstances	 where	 a	 firm’s	 employees	 are	
engaged	in	third‐party	insider	or	outsider	trading.	
V. PROPOSED REFORMS 
To	 this	 point,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 corporate	 criminal	 liability	 for	
true	 insider	 trading	 under	 the	 classical	 theory,91	 true	 insider	 trading	
under	 the	 misappropriation	 theory,92	 and	 source‐employee	 outsider	
trading	under	the	misappropriation	theory	leads	to	the	absurd	result	of	
punishing	 the	victim	 for	 the	crime.93	Moreover,	 recognizing	corporate	
criminal	 liability	 in	 these	three	circumstances	 is	 inconsistent	with	 the	
broader	 policy	 goals	 motivating	 New York Central.94	 But	 not	 all	
corporate	 criminal	 liability	 is	 problematic.	 The	 victim	 of	 third‐party	
trading	for	a	financial	services	firm	is	always	someone	outside	the	firm	
(the	counterparty	or	the	third‐party	source	of	the	information).	There	
is	 therefore	 no	 obvious	 incoherence	 in	 punishing	 the	 corporation	 for	
the	employee’s	crime.95	Moreover,	 in	some	cases	a	corporate	criminal	
indictment	 may	 be	 the	 only	 effective	 means	 of	 checking	 third‐party	
tippee	 trading	 that	 is	 encouraged	 by	 a	 hedge	 fund	 or	 other	 financial	
	
	 87.	 Chapman,	Jennings	&	Tarasuk,	supra	note	80,	at	445.	
 88. Id.	at	459.	
 89. Id.	at	448	(quoting	U.S.	Att’y	Preet	Bharara).	
 90. Id.	at	443–44.	
 91. Supra	Part	IV(A).	
 92. Supra	Part	IV(B).	
 93. Supra	Part	IV(C).	
 94. See generally	 N.Y.	 Cent.	 &	 Hudson	 River	 R.R.	 Co.	 v.	 United	 States,	 212	 U.S.	 481	 (1909)	
(holding	that	the	corporation	should	be	liable	for	the	acts	of	its	agents).	
	 95.	 I	 say	 no	 “obvious”	 incoherence	 to	 account	 for	 the	 arguments	 of	 Hasnas	 and	 Velasquez	
(above)	that	all	corporate	criminal	liability	is	problematic	at	least	in	part	because	it	involves	the	
punishment	of	innocent	shareholders.	See generally Hasnas, supra	note	3	(discussing	the	morality	
of	 corporate	 criminal	 responsibility).	 Indeed,	 David	 Cohen	 reportedly	 complained	 that	 he,	 as	
principal	shareholder	for	SAC	Capital	was	forced	to	pay	more	than	one	billion	dollars	in	fines	“for	
the	actions	of	what	he	calls	 ‘rogue	employees.’”	Chapman,	 Jennings	&	Tarasuk,	supra	note	80,	at	
460.	
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services	 firm’s	 morally	 hazardous	 incentive	 structure.	 This	 is	
particularly	true	where	the	high‐level	architects	of	the	firm’s	incentive	
structure	 are	 themselves	 effectively	 immune	 from	 insider	 trading	
liability,	 and	 this	 is	 precisely	 the	 concern	 that	 motivated	 the	 Court’s	
recognition	of	corporate	criminal	liability	in	New York Central.	
Consistent	 with	 these	 conclusions,	 this	 Article	 proposes	 the	
following	 reforms,	 though	 there	 is	 no	 space	 to	 develop	 them	 here.	
Statutory	constraints	should	be	placed	on	prosecutors	when	 indicting	
corporations	 for	 insider	 trading	 under	 Section	 10(b).	 Prosecutors	
should	 be	 permitted	 to	 exercise	 their	 discretion	 in	 bringing	
indictments	against	firms	whose	employees	are	engaged	in	third‐party	
insider	or	outsider	 trading	within	 the	scope	of	 their	employment	and	
for	the	benefit	of	the	firm,	but	they	should	be	expressly	precluded	from	
bringing	 indictments	 against	 corporations	 for	 the	 insider	 trading	 of	
their	 employees	 under	 Section	 10(b)	 in	 all	 other	 circumstances.	 This	
proposed	reform	would,	of	course,	still	leave	all	employees	individually	
liable	for	their	illegal	insider	trading.	
I	anticipate	the	objection	that	this	is	all	much	ado	about	nothing	in	
that	 corporations	 are	 rarely	 indicted	 for	 insider	 trading,	 and,	 when	
they	are,	 it	 is	precisely	 the	 firms	 I	have	 suggested	 that	 are	 legitimate	
targets.	Prior	to	the	1988	indictment	of	Drexel	Burnham	Lambert,	only	
individuals	had	been	indicted	for	insider	trading.96	Since	then,	very	few	
firms	 have	 been	 indicted	 for	 insider	 trading,	 and	 most	 of	 those	 that	
have	 been	 indicted	would	 be	 legitimate	 targets	 even	 if	 the	 proposed	
reform	 were	 implemented.97	 But	 this	 only	 tells	 half	 the	 story.	
Prosecutors	 are	 mindful	 of	 the	 often	 disastrous,	 and	 therefore	
politically	harmful,	collateral	consequences	of	a	corporate	indictment.98	
Experience	has	taught	them	that	the	mere	threat	of	an	indictment	gives	
them	 all	 the	 power	 they	 need	 to	 either	 force	 a	 change	 in	 firms’	
compliance	 practices,	 or	 to	 force	 corporations	 to	 cooperate	 in	 the	
government’s	 investigations	 of	 the	 firm	 or	 its	 employees.	 The	 recent	
increase	 in	 Deferred	 Prosecution	 Agreements	 and	 the	 recent	 Yates	
	
 96. See	 FIRST,	 supra	 note	 5,	 at	 159.	 This	 indictment,	 and	 other	 events	 surrounding	 it,	
ultimately	led	to	the	firm’s	collapse	in	1990.	For	a	brilliant	account	of	this,	see	STEWART,	supra	note	
55.	
 97. See, e.g.,	 United	 States	 v.	 Teicher,	 987	 F.2d	 112	 (2d	 Cir.	 1993)	 (third‐party	 investment	
firm);	United	States	v.	Marcus	Schloss	&	Co.,	 Inc.,	724	F.	Supp.	1123	(S.D.N.Y.	1989)	(third‐party	
brokerage	firm);	Voreacos,	supra note	74	(third‐party	hedge	fund);	see also	United	States	v.	S.A.C.	
Capital	 Advisors,	 L.P.,	 No.	 13	 Civ.	 5182,	 2013	WL	 5913921	 (S.D.N.Y.	 Nov.	 5,	 2013)	 (third‐party	
hedge	fund).	
 98. Supra note	 55.	 The	 downfalls	 of	 Arthur	 Anderson	 and	 Drexel	 Burnham	 Lambert	 offer	
recent	examples.	
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Memorandum	are	clear	reflections	of	this	strategy.	As	Professor	Hasnas	
puts	it,	
It	 has	 become	 apparent	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 corporate	 criminal	
liability	 is	 not	 to	 punish	 corporations,	 but	 to	 force	 them	 to	
cooperate	 in	 the	prosecution	of	 their	employees.	This	 is	evidenced	
by	 the	 constantly	 increasing	 number	 of	 federal	 criminal	
investigations	 of	 business	 organizations	 that	 end	 in	 Deferred	
Prosecution	 Agreement	 coupled	 with	 a	 constantly	 decreasing	
number	which	end	with	corporate	indictments	and	convictions.	It	is	
anachronistic	 to	 think	 of	 the	 purpose	 of	 corporate	 prosecution	 as	
the	 imposition	 of	 punishment	 upon	 conviction.	 Today,	 it	 is	
corporate	 indictment	 that	 is	 the	 punishment	 and	 lack	 of	
cooperation	that	is	the	offense.99	
The	 mere	 threat	 of	 indictment	 for	 the	 insider	 trading	 of	 its	
employees	 has	 forced	 issuers	 to	 adopt	 overbroad	 insider	 trading	
compliance	programs	that	come	at	a	heavy	price	in	terms	of	corporate	
culture,	 cost	 of	 compensation,	 share	 liquidity,	 and	 cost	 of	 capital.100	
Moreover,	recent	criminal	investigations	of	employee	use	of	Exchange	
Act	 Rule	 10b5–1(c)	 trading	 plans101	 have	 also	 put	 issuers	 on	 the	
defensive	concerning	the	possible	insider	trading	of	their	employees.102	
This	 Article	 has	 suggested	 that	 any	 leverage	 derived	 by	 prosecutors	
from	(1)	 the	threat	of	 indicting	 issuers	 for	the	 insider	trading	of	 their	
employees	under	either	 the	 classical	or	misappropriation	 theories,	or	
(2)	 from	 the	 threat	 of	 indicting	 source‐companies	 for	 the	 insider	
trading	 of	 their	 employees	 under	 the	 misappropriation	 theory,	 is	
illegitimate.	
VI. CONCLUSION 
The	 Court	 in	New York Central	 recognized	 that	 “there	 are	 some	
crimes,	which	in	their	nature	cannot	be	committed	by	corporations.”103	
This	 Article	 has	 suggested	 that	 true	 insider	 trading	 and	 source‐
employee	outsider	 trading	 are	 crimes	 that	 cannot	be	 committed	by	 a	
company.	Corporate	criminal	liability	in	these	circumstances	yields	the	
	
	 99.	 Hasnas,	supra	note	3,	at	1354.	
 100. See generally	Anderson,	Solving the Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance,	supra	note	49	
(explaining	the	costs	and	issues	associated	with	insider	trading	compliance	programs).	
	 101.	 17	C.F.R.	§	240.10b5‐1(c)	(2014).	
 102. See, e.g.,	 John	 P.	 Anderson,	 Anticipating a Sea Change for Insider Trading Law: From 
Trading Plan Crisis to Rational Reform,	2015	UTAH	L.	REV.	339	(2015)	(discussing	the	vast	amount	
of	change	that	has	occurred	within	the	area	of	insider	trading).	
 103. N.Y.	Cent.	&	Hudson	River	R.R.	Co.	v.	United	States,	212	U.S.	481,	494	(1909).	
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absurd	 result	 of	 punishing	 the	 victims	 for	 the	 crime.	 Prosecutors	
should,	 however,	 continue	 to	 enjoy	 discretion	 to	 hold	 corporations	
liable	for	the	third‐party	insider	or	outsider	trading	of	their	employees.	
Finally,	the	reforms	proposed	here	would	not	affect	individual	liability	
for	insider	trading	under	any	theory.	
	
